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Television Docudramas and the Right
of Publicity: Too Bad Liz,
That's Show Biz
by LISA A. LAWRENCE*
I
Introduction
In the past decade, television networks have aired an increas-
ing number of docudramas. 1 A docudrama is the presentation
of real events and real people through the medium of film.
2
Many of these made-for-TV movies have been based on the
lives of deceased celebrities3 and other famous persons,4 living5
and dead. As the popularity of the docudrama has increased,
many questions have arisen regarding the legal ramifications of
this genre of expression. These questions include what exactly
is a docudrama, whether it is a commercial product, whether it
is protected by the first amendment, and whether a docudrama
* Member, Third Year Class.
1. This note deals primarily with television docudramas, but the same analysis
applies equally to motion pictures.
2. See Manson, The Television Docudrama and the Right of Publicity, 7 CoM. &
L. 41 n.2 (1985).
3. A celebrity is generally considered to be someone who has achieved fame and
recognition in the areas of sports or entertainment. See Ropski, The Right of Public-
ity-The Trend Towards Protecting a Celebrity's Celebrity, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 251,
252-56 (1982). As used in this note, "celebrity" also refers to other famous individuals.
See infra note 4. For purposes of defamation law, a celebrity may be considered a
public figure. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
4. A famous person is any person who has achieved some degree of fame, recog-
nition or notoriety. This may include private citizens who have been thrown into the
limelight for various reasons. For instance, as a child, Gloria Vanderbilt was famous
for being a victim of an unseemly custody battle. A person could also be famous for
his involvement in a crime.
5. Living persons who have been the subject of docudramas include Prince
Charles and Princess Diana, and Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis. Docudramas made on
famous criminal cases include The Burning Bed, Fatal Vision, A Murder in Texas, and
The Longest Night.
6. Examples of deceased persons who have been the subject of docudramas in-
clude John F. Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, Hedda Hopper and Louella Parsons, Prin-
cess Grace, William Randolph Hearst and Marion Davies, Marilyn Monroe, Clark
Gable and Carole Lombard, Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt, and Howard Hughes.
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can infringe on a celebrity's right of publicity. These questions
remain as yet unanswered and have already had a chilling ef-
fect on freedom of expression through this medium.7
Television networks fear suits by celebrities who are opposed
to having their life stories televised in unauthorized docu-
dramas. More specifically, the networks are afraid that a celeb-
rity will use the right of publicity to successfully prevent a
docudrama based on his life from being produced and aired.
Celebrities, on the other hand, believe that docudramas are a
threat to the merchantability of their life stories.8 They dispute
the networks' claims that docudramas are outside the reach of
the right of publicity.9  The uncertain legal status of
docudramas and the confused state of the right of publicity
have caused at least one network to shelve its plans to produce
a docudrama on the life of a living celebrity.10
This commentary will explore the right of publicity. Because
that right is still developing, the courts often look to case law
involving statutory or common law privacy rights. Courts do so
because "the rights of privacy and of publicity are intertwined
due to the similarity between the nature of the interests pro-
tected by each."" For this reason, the right of privacy is re-
ferred to throughout this commentary when analyzing the
applicable case law. Furthermore, much of the case law in this
note involves New York law, particularly the New York pri-
vacy statute.12 Since the New York courts are merely analogiz-
ing the right of publicity to the right of privacy, the analysis
and conclusions made are not limited to New York actions, but
are equally applicable to California and other states which rec-
ognize the common law right of publicity. 3
This commentary will briefly deal with defamation law be-
cause the courts occasionally misapply defamation standards to




11. Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (citing W.
PROSSER, TORTS 804 (4th ed. 1977)).
12. See infra note 30.
13. Other states have referred to privacy rights when analyzing a right of public-
ity claim. See, e.g., Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425 (1979),
168 Cal. Rptr. 323, Eastwood v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 140 Cal. App.
3d 409, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1983); The Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social
Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Prod., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854 (N.D. Ga. 1981); and
Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D. N.J. 1981).
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right of publicity claims. It will also explore the nature of
docudrama and the uncertainties involved in applying the per-
tinent law to docudramas. This commentary concludes that
right of publicity actions are inapplicable to docudramas which
accurately portray the celebrity's life story. Finally, it suggests
a solution that may enable the networks to produce
docudramas without fear of suit.
II
The Right of Publicity
A. Definition
The right of publicity14 refers to an individual's 15 right to con-
trol the commercial exploitation or economic value of his name,
picture, likeness or identity. 6 Commercial exploitation is the
use of some part of the person's identity to sell a product or
service.1 7 Commercial exploitation can be authorized, as when
a celebrity has granted a license for such use. It can also be
unauthorized, as when no license exists or when there is a first
amendment privilege for the use. An example of such a privi-
lege is the use of a person's picture when relaying a news-
worthy story about that person."' While a few states have
statutes concerning the descendibility of publicity rights,1 9 the
right of publicity itself is based on common law.20 It was de-
14. The term "right of publicity" was first coined in 1953 in the case of Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) (use of
baseball player's picture on baseball cards).
15. The right of publicity is usually only recognized for celebrities and public
figures. Some commentators believe, however, that the right should extend to every-
one. See generally Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203,
213 (1954); Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History,
55 Nw. U.L. REV. 553, 611 (1960).
16. Some jurisdictions extend this right to protect group names, Winterland Con-
cessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201 (N.D. Ill. 1981), nicknames, Hirsch v. S.C. John-
son & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280 N.W.2d 129 (1979), and voices and signatures, Cal.
Civ. Code § 990(a) (West Supp. 1985).
17. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 326, 603 P. 2d
425, 428 (1979).
18. See Ann-Margaret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401, 405
(S.D.N.Y. 1980).
19. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West
1972); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (Baldwin 1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-208 (1983);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 839.2 (West 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1103(b),
1104(b)(1) (1984); and VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-40A, 18.2-216.1 (1984).
20. See 2 T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, ENTERTAINMENT LAW §§ 19.01-02 (1983).
No. 2]
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rived from the common law and statutory right of privacy as
recognized in most states.
B. Historical Development
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote a now fa-
mous law review article in which they laid the foundation for
the right of privacy.21 They defined this right as "the right 'to
be let alone.'"22 Dean Prosser clarified this definition by stat-
ing "[t]he law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of inva-
sion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied
together by the common name, but otherwise have almost
nothing in common except that each represents an interference
with the right of the plaintiff... 'to be let alone.' ",23 Prosser
categorized these four invasions as: (1) intrusion on physical
solitude; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) publicity that
places the plaintiff in a false light; and (4) appropriation of
one's name or likeness for the defendant's advantage.24 A few
states have codified this fourth category in privacy or misappro-
priation statutes. 25 In most states, however, all four categories,
if recognized at all, remain uncodified.
Following the Warren and Brandeis article, most states rec-
ognized a common law right of privacy.26 The New York
courts, however, did not.27 In 1902, a case was filed in New
York in which a young woman complained that her photograph
had been used without her consent to advertise the defendant's
flour.2 Because New York did not recognize any statutory or
common law right of privacy, the court felt compelled to deny
21. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). Their
interest in writing this article was spurred by the extensive coverage that gossip col-
umnists gave to the social life of Warren's wife. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV.
383 (1960).
22. 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890).
23. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
24. Id.
25. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West
1972); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 391.170 (Baldwin 1984) MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 214,
§ 3A (West Supp. 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-208 (1983); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-
51 (McKinney 1984-85); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 839.2 (West 1983); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 47-25-1103, 1104 (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-3-1 to -6 (1981); and VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 8.01-40, 18.2-216.1 (1984).
26. See Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by
the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1581 (1979).
27. See infra note 28.
28. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
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the plaintiff relief.29 Soon afterward, and as a direct result of
the public's outrage with the outcome of this case, the state leg-
islature enacted the New York Right of Privacy Act, codified in
New York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51.30 The Act pro-
vides both criminal and civil remedies for unauthorized use of a
person's name, portrait or picture for advertising or for pur-
poses of trade."
When a private individual's name, likeness or photograph is
misappropriated by another for commercial purposes, the indi-
vidual may bring an action based on the common law right of
privacy or infringement of rights under a privacy or misappro-
priation statute, such as New York Civil Rights Law section 51.
Celebrities usually cannot bring such actions because they have
waived their rights of privacy. 32 The right of publicity recog-
nizes that such people should still be protected from having
their images exploited when such exploitation is primarily for
commercial purposes.3
29. Id. at 556, 64 N.E. at 447.
30. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976). Section 51 states:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the
purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without
having first obtained the written consent of such person ... is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Section 51 states:
Any person whose name, portrait or picture is used within this state for
advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without the written consent
first obtained as above provided may maintain an equitable action in the
supreme court of this state against the person, firm or corporation so using
his name, portrait or picture, to prevent and restrain the use thereof; and
may also sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained by reason of
such use.
31. Id.
32. See infra note 33 and accompanying text. See also Nimmer, The Right of Pub-
licity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 204-05 (1954).
33. As one court stated:
The right of publicity is a concept which has evolved from the common law
of privacy and its tort 'of appropriation, for the defendant's benefit or advan-
tages, of the plaintiff's name or likeness.' The term 'right of publicity' has
since come to signify the right of an individual, especially a public figure or a
celebrity, to control the commercial value and exploitation of his name and
picture or likeness and to prevent others from unfairly appropriating this
value for their commercial benefit. The idea generally underlying an action
for a right of privacy is that the individual has a right personal to him to be
let alone and, thus, to prevent others from invading his privacy, injuring his
feelings, or assaulting his peace of mind. In contract, underlying the right of
publicity concept is a desire to benefit from the commercial exploitation of
one's name and likeness.
Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1353 (D. N.J. 1981).
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C. Social Policies Underlying the Right of Publicity
The right of publicity recognizes that there are some people,
particularly celebrities, athletes and other public figures, who,
instead of fearing publicity, seek it. These people generally
devote their time, energy and talents to developing a marketa-
ble commodity-"themselves." The right of publicity gives
such a person a limited monopoly in the value of this commod-
ity by granting property rights. 4 This monopoly is somewhat
analogous to the monopoly granted in copyright law.35 The mo-
nopoly is not unlimited in scope and is restricted by the first
amendment free speech doctrine in much the same way that
the fair use doctrine limits copyright.
3 6
There are at least three theories which support the recogni-
tion of the right of publicity.37 The first is the theory of unjust
enrichment .3  This theory recognizes that a celebrity spends
considerable time, money and energy in developing a marketa-
ble public image. The right of publicity therefore prevents a
defendant from unauthorized exploitation of this image by giv-
ing the celebrity exclusive rights to market and license his im-
age. As the court stated in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 39 "No social purpose is served by having the
defendant get for free some aspect of the plaintiff that would
34. Several commentators have discussed the limitations which should be placed
on the right of publicity. See, e.g., Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954); Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of
Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577 (1979); Hoffman, Limitations on the
Right of Publicity, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y OF THE U.S.A. 111 (1980); Kulzick &
Hogue, Chilled Bird: Freedom of Expression in the Eighties, 14 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 57
(1980).
35. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). See generally Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-
810 (1982). See also, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575-77
(1977).
36. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). The fair use doctrine basically allows limited copying
of a copyrighted work without permission from the author when the copying is used
for purposes of criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, or other uses protected
under the first amendment. The right of publicity is similarly limited by first amend-
ment considerations of newsworthiness, free dissemination of information, free
speech, etc.
37. See 2 T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, ENTERTAINMENT LAW § 19.01 (1983).
38. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978) (poster
of Elvis Presley); Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 77, 232 A.2d
458, 462 (1967), (game using golfer's name and statistics); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (performance of human cannonball act);
Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 223, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (pic-
ture of nude female boxer misidentified as plaintiff).
39. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
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have market value and for which he would normally pay."40
This equitable theory approach avoids the issue of property
rights.
The second theory is based on the social policy of encourag-
ing individual creativity, which in turn benefits society as a
whole.41 As noted in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures,42 "[T]here is
a broader social objective implicit in according judicial protec-
tion to the right of publicity, analogous to the policies underly-
ing copyright and patent law. ' 43 Recognition of the right of
publicity creates incentives for expending one's time and en-
ergy "to develop the skills or achievements [which are] prereq-
uisite[s] to public recognition. ' 44 It does so by rewarding the
individual with a limited property right in the image he has cre-
ated and protecting him against unauthorized commercial ex-
ploitation of that image, thus ensuring that the individual may
"reap the reward of his endeavors. '45 While the celebrity is the
immediate beneficiary of his labors, "[his] performances, inven-
tions and endeavors enrich our society, [and his] participation
in commercial enterprises may communicate valuable informa-
tion to consumers. '46 This theory creates a limited property
right that enables the celebrity to prevent others from misap-
propriating his image.
The third theory is based on preservation of the economic
value of the celebrity's identity. This is a true property law
view which focuses on protecting the rights of both the celeb-
rity and his licensees. By granting a limited monopoly, the
right of publicity acts not only to compensate the celebrity for
his achievements, but to protect the contractual interests of the
celebrity's licensees, who are authorized to exploit the celeb-
40. Id. at 576 (quoting Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966)).
41. See 2 T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, ENTERTAINMENT LAW § 19.01 (1983); Zacchini
v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577 (1977).
42. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
43. Id. at 839, 603 P.2d at 441, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 339. Copyright law encourages
individuals to devote their lives "to intellectual and artistic creation" by rewarding
them with limited monopolies on their creations. Id. (quoting Goldstein v. California,
412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973)). The underlying rationale is that society benefits from the
furtherance of art and science. Therefore, the law rewards those who devote them-
selves to such endeavors. Presumably, the law thus recognizes that without a finan-
cial reward, few would be willing to pursue the arts for altruistic purposes alone.
44. Id. at 840, 603 P.2d at 441, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
45. Id. (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. at 573).
46. Id. at 840, 603 P.2d at 441-42, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 339-40 (citations omitted).
No. 21
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rity's identity. The recognition of a property interest in the ce-
lebrity's identity ensures that the celebrity may contract away
such rights.
From an economic standpoint, unauthorized use of a celeb-
rity's name, picture or likeness to advertise a product has the
potential of a double loss of income for the celebrity. Not only
will he lose the particular endorsement fee but, in certain cir-
cumstances, he may also have a diminished earning capacity.
As one commentator noted, there are three instances when an
advertisement may injure future earning capacity: "(1) when
the advertised product or service is shoddy; (2) when the per-
son pictured or named in the advertisement has already en-
dorsed a like product; and (3) when a significant segment of
the public knows that the person neither uses nor recommends
the product. ' 48 In these instances, the celebrity may be viewed
as being irresponsible or deceptive, thus potentially diminish-
ing the value of any future endorsements by the celebrity.49
D. Legal Elements of the Right of Publicity
New York courts have divided a right of publicity cause of
action into three elements. To bring a claim under the right of
publicity, a celebrity must show: (1) "that his name, picture,
likeness or image has publicity value;" (2) that he has exploited
his image in such a manner that it is evident that he recognizes
this commercial value; and (3) that defendant has misappropri-
ated the celebrity's image for purposes of trade or advertising,
without the celebrity's consent.50
The first element is readily proven.5 In the instance of a
47. See 2 T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, ENTERTAINMENT LAW § 19.01 (1983).
48. Treece, Commercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses, and Personal Histo-
ries, 51 TEX. L. REV. 537, 642-43 (1973).
49. Id. at 643.
50. See Lerman v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 228, 232 (S.D.N.Y.
1981); Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
51. See supra note 15. Some commentators believe that the right of publicity
should extend to everyone. See generally, Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 203 (1954); Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personal-
ity and History, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 553, 611 (1960). While a private individual could
bring a claim under invasion of privacy for misappropriation of name, picture or like-
ness, this theory essentially protects the person's right to be left alone. See supra note
22. It may be the case that this person is not embarrassed by the use of his name,
picture or likeness but is, in fact, flattered. There is still no reason why the defendant
should be able to use the name, picture or likeness for advertising or trade purposes
without compensating this person. The right of publicity should be available in these
[Vo!l. 8
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docudrama based on the life of a celebrity, the person's celeb-
rity status and the fact that a docudrama is made is proof
enough that the celebrity's name, et cetera, has publicity value.
The element of exploitation is inherent in the docudrama's
subject.52 Most, if not all, celebrities realize their commercial
value and base their livelihoods on exploiting this value. 3
The third element, misappropriation for trade or advertising
purposes (unauthorized commercial exploitation), is really the
key issue in stating a cause of action for the right of publicity.
The courts have had little difficulty in defining "trade or adver-
tising purposes" where the product or service was clearly com-
mercial. For instance, celebrities may prevail where their
names, pictures or likenesses are used without authorization
for baseball cards,54 clothing advertisements,55 magazine por-
traits,56 posters,57 statues,58 merchandise,5 9 games,60 and novelty
instances to ensure that compensation is received. The real question is not whether
the person's name or picture has any commercial value but how much value it has.
Contra, Pilpel, The Right of Publicity, 27 BuLL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y, 249, 256 (1980); Ali
v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F.
Supp. 876, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
52. This is true when dealing with celebrities and many public figures. This is not
the case, however, when one is dealing with certain individuals who have not made a
career out of exploiting the commercial value of their personalities. For instance, a
person involved in a famous criminal case may find himself the subject of a
docudrama. In those jurisdictions requiring the exploitation element in a right of
publicity cause of action, such an individual may not be able to state a valid publicity
claim.
53. In relation to the noncelebrity, exploitation does not occur until the defendant
misappropriates the person's name, picture, or likeness. While the exploitation does
not result from the noncelebrity's effort (see supra note 52), this person should still be
protected from commercial exploitation by another. Exploitation has generally been
discussed in cases where descendibiity of the right of publicity is at issue. See gener-
ally Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Factors Etc., Inc.
v. Pro Arts, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In cases where the person whose
name or picture was misappropriated is still living, exploitation may not be a real
issue or at least may be subject to question as to whether it is a necessary element in a
right of publicity cause of action. See 2 T. SELZ & M. SIMENSKY, ENTERTAINMENT LAW
§ 19.08 n.8 (1983) and Note, An Assessment of the Commercial Exploitation Require-
ment as a Limit on the Right of Publicity, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1703 (1983).
54. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d
Cir. 1953).
55. Grant v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 880 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
56. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
57. Factors, Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 222 (2d Cir. 1978); Brinkley v.
Casablancas, 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1981).
58. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 960 (6th Cir. 1980);
The Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage
Prods., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 854, 866 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
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items.61  But when first amendment considerations are
presented, some of these very same commercial uses are viewed
as privileged and, therefore, are exempted from liability.62
E. Legal Analysis Used in Right of Publicity Case Law
If a docudrama is a commercial product, as contended in this
note, then the celebrity's interest in obtaining compensation for
such use must be weighed against the public interest in free
dissemination of information.63 The legal analysis employed in
cases using this weighing process has not always been clear.
In 1968, Pat Paulsen, a famous comedian, announced his can-
didacy for president. His publicity stunt received much atten-
tion from the press and caused Personality Posters, Inc. to
produce and sell a poster of Paulsen with the words "For Presi-
dent" at the bottom. In Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc.,'
Paulsen claimed that this poster infringed on his rights of pri-
vacy and publicity.
In its analysis, the Paulsen court noted that the right of pub-
licity "does not invest a prominent person with the right to ex-
ploit financially every public use of name or picture. ' 65 It went
on to state that rights of privacy or publicity have no applica-
tion where the use of the person's name or picture is made in
connection with a matter of public interest.66 In light of the
public's interest in political campaigns, the poster was held to
be constitutionally protected. 7
The Paulsen court never considered whether the poster was
or was not a commercial product. Instead, it avoided the issue
by stating that the poster appeared to be privileged because of
its public interest character .6  The court should have stated
59. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 813-14, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr.
323 (1979).
60. Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 72, 232 A.2d 458 (1967).
61. Bi-Rite Enters., Inc. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188, 1201 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
62. Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct.
1968) (poster); Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401, 406
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (magazine portrait).
63. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
64. 59 Misc. 2d 501 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968). The privacy cause of action
was based on New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50-51. See supra note 30 for text of pri-
vacy statute.
65. 59 Misc. 2d at 450, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
66. Id. at 451, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 508.
67. Id. at 451, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
68. Id. 299 N.Y.S.2d at 509. The courts have often reversed the steps in their legal
[Vol. 8
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that, although the poster was clearly commercial in nature, the
first amendment carves out an exception to publicity rights
that precludes liability when the public interest in free speech
and free dissemination of information outweighs the celebrity's
property rights.
In Brinkley v. Casablanca,69 Christie Brinkley, a famous
fashion model, brought a similar suit alleging the same causes
of action when a company produced and sold an unauthorized
poster of her. The New York Supreme Court noted "at the out-
set that the sale of the poster was a use of plaintiff's photograph
for trade purposes."7 The court also noted that the New York
privacy statute, although liberally construed, is restricted in its
application when first amendment considerations of newswor-
thiness and free dissemination of information are involved.71
Although the court was referring to the privacy claim, it stated
that the privacy statute does not distinguish between a private
individual with hurt feelings and a public figure who has suf-
fered some economic injury.7 2 Rather, the court noted that the
statute requires two elements: (1) commercial use of a person's
name or picture, and (2) failure to obtain the person's written
consent for the use.73 The court held that the plaintiff's rights
had been infringed and issued a permanent injunction against
further sales of the poster.74
In Grant v. Esquire, Inc. 75 a case alleging violation of plain-
analysis. Instead of finding the product was an unauthorized commercial exploitation
and then using the first amendment to carve out an exemption from liability, the
courts have used the first amendment arguments to find that the product was not a
commercial exploitation. Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 58 Misc. 2d
14 (1968), 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 127; Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F.
Supp. 401, 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
In a copyright action, a comparable reverse analysis would first look at the use an
alleged infringer is making of the work. Then, if such use fell within the fair use
doctrine (17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982)), the court would declare that the copyright is not
valid as to that use. This, however, is not the type of analysis that occurs in a copy-
right action. In copyright cases, the court first decides if the plaintiff owns a valid
copyright. If so, it then determines whether the fair use doctrine will exempt the
alleged use from liability. If there is no valid copyright, further analysis is simply
unnecessary.
69. 80 A.D.2d 428, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004 (1981).
70. Id. at 433, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1008.
71. Id. at 432, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1007 (citing Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d
124, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967)).
72. Id. at 440, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1012.
73. Id.
74. 80 A.D.2d at 444, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 1014.
75. 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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tiff's rights of privacy and publicity for unauthorized use of his
photograph, the court stated, "[There are] two basic questions:
(1) Has plaintiff stated one or more valid claims under state
law? (2) If so, is there a constitutional bar to plaintiff's en-
forcement of such an otherwise valid state claim?"76
In another case, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York stated that the right of publicity
"grants a person an exclusive right to control the commercial
value of his name and likeness and to prevent others from ex-
ploiting that value without permission. ' 77 The use of the word
"exclusive" implies that the holder of the right is the only per-
son who has the right to commercially exploit his identity. A
more thorough analysis would have added that the "exclusive"
right is subject to certain exemptions, set forth by first amend-
ment policies, whereby others can also exploit the holder's
identity without his authorization.
The Paulsen, Brinkley and Esquire cases illustrate that a
two-step analysis is appropriate in right of publicity cases.
First, the court should determine whether the product in ques-
tion is an unauthorized commercial exploitation. If not, there
is no need to consider whether the first amendment protects
that product because the plaintiff will have failed to set forth a
valid cause of action.
If the court finds that an unauthorized commercial exploita-
tion has occurred, it should then proceed to the second step and
consider whether the first amendment protects that exploita-
tion. In doing so, it should weigh the public interest against the
celebrity's interest and deny the celebrity's claim if the public
interest is stronger.
76. I& at 878. Although the Esquire court followed its own enumerated guide-
lines, it cited several cases and then stated:
In all but the last of the cases above cited the plaintiff was denied recovery
under § 51 [of the New York privacy statute], for the reason that in each the
court held plaintiff's picture to have been "reasonably related" to a news-
worthy subject and thus its use not to have been "for purposes of trade"
within the meaning of § 51. Id. at 879.
Here the Esquire court noted the various cases which have used a reverse analysis, but
it did not acknowledge that analysis. See supra, note 68.





The First Amendment and the Life Story
A. The First Amendment Exemption and Its Limitations
The first amendment exempts certain uses from liability.
Whether a cause of action is based on infringement of copy-
right, invasion of privacy or the right of publicity, the consider-
ations for determining the exemptions are the same. These
considerations include free speech, free dissemination of infor-
mation and newsworthiness. 8 In a right of publicity case, the
plaintiff's interest in the economic value of his identity is
weighed against the public interest in these first amendment
considerations. If the public interest outweighs the celebrity's,
the use of the celebrity's identity will be exempted from liabil-
ity.79 The following case exemplifies when the celebrity's inter-
est outweighs the public interest.
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.80 involved a poster of Elvis
Presley, with the words "In Memory... 1935-1977" printed on
it, which was issued shortly after Presley's death. In determin-
ing whether the poster was newsworthy, the court compared
the case with Paulsen. With no real explanation, the court
found for the plaintiff and held that the poster "was not privi-
leged as celebrating a newsworthy event.""' While this conclu-
sion is arguable, 2 it shows that where the use of a celebrity's
78. Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, 58 Misc. 2d 1, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (Sup. Ct.
1968); 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
79. Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct.
1968) (poster); Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (magazine portrait).
The exemption is basically an affirmative defense. Once a plaintiff has proven his
prima facie case, the defendant may raise this defense. The defendant then has the
burden of proving that he stayed within the limits of the exemption. If the defendant
exceeded these limits, determined by defamation standards, the exemption will not be
available and the defendant will be held liable. Therefore, while defamation stan-
dards are not applicable to a right of publicity cause of action (because right of public-
ity is concerned with ownership, not truth or falsity), these standards do apply to the
affirmative defense of a first amendment exemption.
80. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978).
81. Id. at 222.
82. See McLane, The Right of Publicity: Dispelling Survivability, Preemption
and First Amendment Myths Threatening to Eviscerate a Recognized State Right, 20
CAL. W.L. REV. 415, 428-29 (1984) for a criticism of the newsworthiness distinction
between Paulsen and Factors. For criticism of Paulsen, see Note, The Right of Public-
ity-Protection for Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 527, 556-57
(1976); Smith & Sobel, The Mickey Mouse Watch Goes to Washington: Would the
Law Stop the Clock?, 62 TRADEMARK REP. 334, 347 (1972).
No. 2]
COMM/ENT L. J.
identity is not newsworthy, the first amendment exemption
does not apply.
Because the public gains no benefit from false information,
the scope of the first amendment exception is also limited by
defamation standards.83 In the case of a public figure or celeb-
rity, where defamation requires actual malice or reckless disre-
gard for the truth,84 the exemption will not apply when these
standards are met because the celebrity's interests will out-
weigh those of the public.85
For example, actor Clint Eastwood filed suit against the Na-
tional Enquirer for infringement of his right of publicity under
California Civil Code section 334486 when the Enquirer printed
an article about Eastwood and used Eastwood's pictures in both
the article and in television advertisements promoting the mag-
azine. While the article was not defamatory, it was nonethe-
less completely fictional.
The California Court of Appeal first determined that the use
made of Eastwood's name and photograph constituted commer-
cial exploitation.88 Then, the court considered the first amend-
ment issues to determine if the use was privileged or expressly
exempted as a news account. The court held that there is no
exemption for a knowing or reckless falsehood.89
B. The Life Story
A person's "life story" can be presented in a number of ways
and in several different media of expression. It can be substan-
tially true or totally or partially fictitious. It can be presented
83. See infra note 99; see also infra note 89 and accompanying text.
84. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
85. See infra note 90, and notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
86. Similar to New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50-51, California Civil Code § 3344
provides, inter alia:
(a) Any person who knowingly uses another's name, photograph, or like-
ness, in any manner, for purposes of advertising products, merchandise,
goods or services, or for purposes of solicitation of purchases of products,
merchandise, goods or services without such person's prior consent.., shall
be liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a
result thereof ....
.... (d) For purposes of this section, a use of a name ... photograph, or
likeness in connection with any news ... broadcast or account ... shall not
constitute a use for which consent is required under subdivision (a) for pur-
poses of advertising or solicitation.
87. Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1983).
88. Id. at 421, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
89. Id. at 425, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
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orally, in print or in audio-visual form. The following sub-sec-
tions will explore the various means and media for telling a
person's life story and determine which might be actionable
under the right of publicity and which are exempted from lia-
bility by the free speech considerations of the first amendment.
1. Biography
In 1962, Random House began preparing a biography of How-
ard Hughes. On discovering this, Hughes, famous for his obses-
sion with privacy, wrote to Random House, warning that he
would cause trouble if it published the book. Random House
continued with its preparations despite the threats. Hughes
then set up Rosemont Enterprises as a device to stop the unau-
thorized biography. He thought that by assigning the exclusive
rights to his life story to Rosemont, he could prevent Random
House from publishing its version. In Rosemont Enterprises v.
Random House, Inc.,9° Rosemont brought a suit for declaratory
judgment against Random House, alleging commercial ex-
ploitation of Hughes' name, likeness and personality, without
consent, for purposes of trade and profit. Rosemont also al-
leged that Hughes' right of privacy had been violated.
The court noted that the language of the complaint could be
considered to fall under the New York privacy statute91 or a
right of publicity claim.92 The case failed on both theories.
First, because the right of privacy is a personal right and cannot
descend or be assigned,93 Rosemont had no standing to sue on
Hughes' behalf for invasion of privacy. Furthermore, even if
Hughes had brought the suit, the New York privacy statute
does not protect public figures from publication of factual or
biographical information.94
The Rosemont court referred to Time, Inc. v. Hill,95 and
noted that the Supreme Court "has held not only that the fac-
tual reporting of newsworthy persons and events falls within
the constitutional protections for speech and press, but also
that no redress is available even for material and substantial
falsification in such reporting in the absence of proof that the
90. 58 Misc. 2d 1, 294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1968).
91. See supra note 30.
92. 58 Misc. 2d at 3-4, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
93. Id. at 7, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
94. Id. at 6, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 127.
95. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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report was published with knowledge of its falsity or in reck-
less disregard of the truth."9' Thus, the court implied that biog-
raphies are subject only to a defamation standard. To further
emphasize this point the court stated, "The publication of a
newspaper, magazine, or book which imparts truthful news or
other factual information to the public does not fall within 'the
purposes of trade' contemplated by the New York statute, even
though such publication is published and sold for a profit."97
In response to the right of publicity claim, the court noted
that such a claim has the same commercial use element that is
found in a right of privacy claim. Publication of a biography
does not satisfy this commercial use requirement. "Just as a
public figure's 'right of privacy' must yield to the public interest
so too must the 'right of publicity' bow where such conflicts
with the free dissemination of thought, ideas, newsworthy
events, and matters of public interest. 'g Therefore, "a public
figure can have no exclusive rights to his own life story, and
others need no consent or permission of the subject to write a
biography of a celebrity."
99
96. 58 Misc. 2d at 4-5, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 127.
97. Id. at 6, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 128-29 (citations omitted).
98. Id. at 6, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
99. Id. at 6-7, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 129 (citations omitted). See also Corabi v. Curtis
Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 469, 273 A.2d 899, 918 (1971). Policy reasons supporting
this view can be found in Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1356 (D. N.J.
1981), which states:
[T]he purpose of the portrayal [of real people by a news or entertainment
media production] ... must be examined to determine if it predominantly
serves a social function valued by the protection of free speech. If the por-
trayal mainly serves the purpose of contributing information, which is not
false or defamatory, to the public debate of political or social issues or of
providing the free expression of creative talent which contributes to society's
cultural enrichment, then the portrayal generally will be immune from lia-
bility. If, however, the portrayal functions primarily as a means of commer-
cial exploitation, then such immunity will not be granted (citation omitted).
See also Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the
Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1596-99 (1979). Current Audio, Inc. v. RCA Corp., 71 Misc.
2d 831, 337 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1972) also stands for the proposition that the right of public-
ity must fail under the first amendment when the disseminated information is true,
whether it be thoughts, newsworthy events, ideas, or matters of public interest. In yet
another case, Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 768, 427 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1980),
concerning an unauthorized biography of deceased celebrity Marilyn Monroe, the
court took what was perhaps an overly expansive view of when publicity rights must
give way to free expression:
We think it does not matter whether the book is properly described as a biog-
raphy, a fictional biography, or any other kind of literary work. It is not for a
court to pass on literary categories, or literary judgment. It is enough that
the book is a literary work and not simply a disguised commercial advertise-
TELEVISION DOCUDRAMAS
The Rosemont court makes it clear that a biography does not
violate the right of publicity."' But it is not clear just what
constitutes a biography. In a similar case alleging violation of
rights under the same New York privacy statutes for an unau-
thorized biography, the same court stated that the privacy stat-
utes do not apply unless the biography is fictional or
novelized.10' Furthermore, biography is not transformed into
fiction merely because it contains untrue statements. 0 2
It appears then, that a biography is a person's life story told
in such a way that it is a truthful presentation of the facts. Mi-
nor inaccuracies will not transform the biography into fiction,
nor will they allow a defamation claim. However, if a biogra-
phy is "novelized" or "fictionalized," it is not really a biography
at all. It is a novel or fictionalization which commercially ex-
ploits a person's name. Whether such a fictionalized "biogra-
phy" is actionable will be discussed below.
2. Fiction
A second means of presenting a person's life story is through
a fictional account. In this setting, the story is completely in-
vented and only the person's name is used. Two cases illustrate
the truth/falsity continuum into which a fictional account may
fall.
The first case, University of Notre Dame v. Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox,1°s involved a book and a movie which ostensibly fea-
tured the University of Notre Dame. The movie was a farce in
which Notre Dame was used as the "exemplar of supremacy in
[college] football."'01 4 It contained events so ridiculous that no
one could mistake them as being real. Notre Dame alleged un-
fair competition for misappropriation of its name and reputa-
tion. The University could not pursue a privacy action because
ment for the sale of goods or services. The protection of the right of free
expression is so important that we should not extend any right of publicity, if
such exists, to give rise to a cause of action against the publication of a liter-
ary work about a deceased person.
75 A.D.2d at 769, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
100. 58 Misc. 2d at 6, 294 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
101. Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, Inc., 188 Misc. 479, 484, 68 N.Y.S.2d
779, 783 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
102. Id. Such untrue statements may, however, subject the biography to a defama-
tion claim.
103. 22 A.D.2d 452, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301 (1965).
104. Id. at 454, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 303.
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the New York privacy statutes'0 5 only protect living persons.
Instead, it brought another cause of action based on section 397
of the New York General Business Law,0 6 which protects a
nonprofit corporation from unauthorized use of its name for
purposes of trade or advertising. 0 7 The court held that the use
made of plaintiff's name was not contemplated in the legisla-
tive history of section 397 and, therefore, was not a violation of
the statute.
0 8
The court stated that the test applicable to the unfair compe-
tition allegation was whether a viewer would think that the
real Notre Dame was in any way associated with the events in
the movie. The court determined that viewers "know they are
not seeing or reading about real Notre Dame happenings of ac-
tual Notre Dame characters; and there is nothing in text or
film from which they could reasonably infer 'connection or
benefit to the institution.' "109 The result in the case thus
hinged on the fact that nobody was deceived or confused by the
film, nor did the film's producers intend such deception or
confusion." 0
The second case, Hicks v. Casablanca Records,"' involved an
action brought by the heirs and assignees of Agatha Christie to
enjoin distribution of a book and film which used Ms. Christie
as the main character. The story was based on an actual inci-
dent in Ms. Christie's life in which she inexplicably disap-
peared for 11 days. This story was a completely fictionalized
account of the events that took place during her disappear-
ance. 1 2 The only real "facts" were the names of Ms. Christie
and her family. Because privacy and defamation actions cannot
be brought by an individual's heirs or assignees, the plaintiffs
filed suit alleging unfair competition and infringement of the
right of publicity."
13
105. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976).
106. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 397 (McKinney 1968)
107. 22 A.D.2d at 455-56, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 305.
108. Id. at 456, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 305.
109. Id. at 455, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 305 (citing Cornell University v. Messing Bakeries,
Inc., 285 A.D. 490, 492, 138 N.Y.S.2d 280, 282 (1955)).
110. Id. (citing Germanow v. Standard Unbreakable Watch Crystals, 283 N.Y. 1, 18,
27 N.E.2d 212, 219 (1940)).
111. 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
112. The story had Ms. Christie plotting to kill her husband's mistress and engag-
ing in activities to regain his affections.
113. 464 F. Supp at 429.
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The court turned to the New York privacy statute114 for gui-
dance, noting that the rights of privacy and publicity protect
similar interests.11 In determining the constitutional limita-
tions of the statute, the Hicks court noted that "engrafted upon
[the statute are] certain privileged uses or exemptions... [i.e.]
matters of news, history, biography, and other factual subjects
of public interest despite the necessary references to the
names, portraits, identities, or histories of living persons. "116
The Hicks court then held that the privileges and exemptions
of the privacy statute also apply to the right of publicity.
117
The court concluded that the biography privilege did not ap-
ply to the book and movie in question because they did not con-
stitute a biography. Furthermore, they were not privileged as
fair comment, newsworthy, or historical"" because the story
was completely fictionalized. Nevertheless, the court held that
the first amendment prohibited recovery.119
To determine whether the novel and movie, as fictionaliza-
tions, were entitled to constitutional protection, the Hicks court
"noted that other courts, in addressing the scope of first amend-
ment protections of speech, have engaged in a balancing test
between society's interest in the speech for which protection is
sought and the societal, commercial or governmental interests
seeking to restrain such speech.' 120 Unless there are counter-
vailing legal or public policy reasons, free speech is protected.
12 1
In reviewing Notre Dame122 and Spahn v. Julian Messner,
Inc. 123 (a case involving fictionalization), the Hicks court deter-
mined that "the absence or presence of the deliberate falsifica-
tion or an attempt by a defendant to present the disputed
events as true, determines whether the scales in this balancing
114. See supra note 30.
115. 464 F. Supp. at 430.
116. Id. (citing Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 23 A.D.2d 216, 219, 260 N.Y.S.2d 451,
453 (1965)).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 431.
119. Id. at 433.
120. Id. (citing generally to Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time; First
Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935
(1968)).
121. Id.
122. See supra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
123. 23 A.D.2d 216, 260 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1965). See also infra notes 133-37 and accom-
panying text.
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process shall tip in favor of or against protection of the speech
at issue."' 24 In applying this test to the facts of the case, the
court rejected the plaintiffs' claim for two reasons: (1) plain-
tiffs failed to allege deliberate falsification, and (2) readers or
viewers would know the story was fictitious.'25 Therefore, the
first amendment protection which usually attaches to novels
and movies outweighed the publicity rights implicated in Hicks.
To summarize, the right of publicity does not prevail "where a
fictionalized account of an event in the life of a public figure is
depicted in a novel or a movie [if] it is evident to the public that
the events so depicted are fictitious.'
' 26
124. 464 F. Supp. at 433.
125. Id
126. Id. While Hicks may have been a bit conclusory in its rationale for exempting
fiction from publicity liability, 15 months later another case provided a thorough
treatment of this first amendment protection. In Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg
Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 F.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979), the alleged heir of Ru-
dolph Valentino brought an action for an unauthorized fictionalized film on Valen-
tino's life. In her concurrence in the denial of relief, Chief Justice Bird of the
California Supreme Court discussed the significance of giving first amendment pro-
tection to fiction. She stated:
Our courts have often observed that entertainment is entitled to the same
constitutional protection as the exposition of ideas. That conclusion rests on
two propositions. First, "[t]he line between the informing and the entertain-
ing is too elusive for the protection of the basic right. Everyone is familiar
with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man's amusement,
teaches another doctrine." (Winters v. New York (1948) 333 U.S. 507, 510 [92
L. Ed. 840, 847, 68 S. Ct. 665, 667].) Second, entertainment as a mode of self-
expression, is entitled to constitutional protection irrespective of its contribu-
tion to the marketplace of ideas. "For expression is an integral part of the
development of ideas, of mental exploration and of the affirmation of self.
The power to realize his potentiality as a human being begins at this point
and must extend at least this far if the whole nature of man is not to be
thwarted. Hence suppression of belief, opinion and expression is an affront
to the dignity of man, a negation of man's essential nature." (Emerson,
supra, 72 YALE L.J. at p. 897.)
It is clear that works of fiction are constitutionally protected in the same
manner as political treatises and topical news stories. Using fiction as a vehi-
cle, commentaries on our values, habits, customs, laws, prejudices, justice,
heritage and future are frequently expressed. What may be difficult to com-
municate or understand when factually reported may be poignant and pow-
erful if offered in satire, science fiction or parable. Indeed, Dickens and
Dostoevski may well have written more trenchant and comprehensive com-
mentaries on their times than any factual recitation could ever yield. Such
authors are no less entitled to express their views than the town crier with
the daily news or the philosopher with his discourse on the nature of justice.
Even the author who creates distracting tales for amusement is entitled to
constitutional protection. (See Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc. (2d Cir. 1964)
329 F.2d 541, 545; Hill, supra, 76 COLUM. L. REV. at p. 1308.)
Thus, no distinction may be drawn in this context between fictional and
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The court's reference to deliberate falsification (the actual
malice standard used in defamation cases) in determining lia-
bility in privacy actions127 implied that the same standards may
be applicable to right of publicity actions. As already stated,
defamation standards appear to be inapplicable in determining
whether a prima facie case for the right of publicity has been
met because the right of publicity determines who owns the
rights to an individual's image. Thus, the issues are ownership
and compensation, not truth or falsity. At this point in the
case, actual malice is irrelevant.
Furthermore, actual malice standards also have no place in
reference to fictional works. "All fiction, by definition, es-
chews an obligation to be faithful to historical fact.' 12  When
fiction is the medium of expression, "it is meaningless to charge
that the author 'knew' his work was false.' 29 However, actual
malice may play a part in determining the extent of the first
amendment exemption from liability. As stated previously,
the exemption does not apply where there is a showing of
knowing or reckless disregard of the truth.
3 0
If a portrayal of a person's life story is completely or substan-
tially accurate, it is a biography and is therefore protected
under the first amendment. At the other end of the spectrum,
if a story based on a real event is completely fictionalized, and it
is obvious to the audience that the story was invented, first
amendment protections will also prevail. The most difficult
factual accounts of Valentino's life. Respondents' election of the former as
the mode for their views does not diminish the constitutional protection af-
forded speech. If respondents are to be held liable for their expression, a
more persuasive basis must be established.
Contemporary events, symbols and people are regularly used in fictional
works. Fiction writers may be able to more persuasively, or more accurately,
express themselves by weaving into the tale persons or events familiar to
their readers. The choice is theirs. No author should be forced into creating
mythological worlds or characters wholly divorced from reality. The right of
publicity derived from public prominence does not confer a shield to ward off
caricature, parody and satire. Rather, prominence invites creative comment.
Surely, the range of free expression would be meaningfully reduced if promi-
nent persons in the present and recent past were forbidden topics for the
imaginations of authors of fiction.
Id. at 867-69, 603 P.2d at 458-60, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 356-58.
127. Application of actual malice standards to privacy actions was established in
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
128. 25 Cal. 3d at 871, 603 P.2d at 461, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
129. Id.
130. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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legal analysis deals with the middle ground between biography
and fiction, namely fictionalization.
131
3. Fictionalization
The term fictionalization refers to the blending of truth and
fiction in such a manner that it is difficult, if not impossible, to
determine which parts are real and which are invented.
132
Whether fictionalization is accorded any first amendment pro-
tection was addressed by New York's highest court in Spahn v.
Julian Messner, Inc.133 In Spahn, the defendant wrote a fic-
tionalized biography about the plaintiff, a famous baseball
player, in which the defendant invented dialogue and events.
The book was written for children. Plaintiff brought suit
under the New York invasion of privacy statutes.3 In lan-
guage similar to that found in Hicks, the court stated that for a
public figure to recover for an unauthorized version of his life
story, it must be shown that the story is "infected with material
and substantial falsification and that the work was published
with knowledge of such falsification or with a reckless disre-
gard for the truth.
135
The trial court found these defamation standards had been
met because the defendant conceded that there were imaginary
incidents and dialogue and that the chronology had been
manipulated. Echoing the trial court's opinion, the Appellate
Division stated, "In short, defendants made no effort and had
no intention to follow the facts concerning plaintiff's life, ex-
cept in broad outline and to the extent that the facts readily
supplied a dramatic portrayal attractive to the juvenile
reader.' ' 36 The defendants argued that such literary tech-
niques were both necessary and customary in children's biogra-
phies in order to catch the young reader's attention. This
attempted defense failed because the author had done little re-
search, had failed to check out sources, and had never inter-
131. See irqfra note 132 and accompanying text.
132. See generally, Manson, The Television Docudrama and the Right of Publicity,
7 COM. & L. 41 (1985); Note, Towards a Right of Biography: Controlling Commercial
Exploitation of Personal History, 2 COMM/ENT L.J. 489, 490 n.7 (1980); Treece, Com-
mercial Exploitation of Names, Likenesses and Personal Histories, 51 TEX. L. REV.
637, 655-60 (1973).
133. 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967).
134. N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976).
135. 21 N.Y.2d at 127, 233 N.E.2d at 842, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 834.
136. Id. at 127, 233 N.E.2d at 842, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
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viewed the plaintiff, plaintiff's family, or friends. Therefore,
the court held that in light of these limited research efforts,
allowing publication of deliberate fictionalization would be
granting the author a literary license which is beyond that nec-
essary to ensure free speech protection and which destroys the
public figure's limited right to be free "of commercial exploita-
tion of his name and personality.
1 37
The Spahn case clearly shows that fictionalization must be
weighed against the first amendment to determine if it is ex-
empted from liability. Biography consists of facts in the public
domain. Fiction is created in the mind of the author. Unlike
pure biography or pure fiction, which are protected by defini-
tion, fictionalization is a blending of both and depends on the
facts of each case. Using Spahn, a test can be formulated for
determining when fictionalization is actionable. This test
would weigh the amount of fictionalization, first amendment
considerations, including whether the fictionalization was de-
liberate or reckless, thereby cutting off a possible exemption,
and the celebrity's interests in the value of his identity.
4. Docudramatization
For purposes of this note, docudramatization refers to the
process that takes place when a docudrama is made. This pro-
cess involves the blending of biography and invented dialogue.
While fictionalization refers to a random blending of truth and
fiction so that it is difficult to determine what is true and what
is not, docudramatization consists of adding fictional dialogue
to a biographical treatment of a celebrity's life story. Thus, in
137. Id. at 128-29, 233 N.E.2d at 843, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 835-36. A strong dissent argued
that the privacy statutes should not apply in this case. It argued that if the material
complained of was found to have been written only negligently or even innocently,
defendants would have won because the defamation standard of actual malice would
not have been met. The dissent also stated that even though the fictionalized parts
were literally not correct, the writer seemed to have considered those parts to be con-
sistent with Spahn's life or perhaps even likely to have happened. The dissent be-
lieved that in light of the direction defamation actions have taken, id. at 130, 233
N.E.2d at 844, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 837 (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)), pure fiction concerning a public fig-
ure should not be actionable under the New York privacy statute. Spahn, 21 N.Y.2d at
130, 233 N.E.2d at 844, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 837-38. Accordingly, under the dissent's analy-
sis, the court should have held that the statute gives no protection against fictionaliza-
tion which is not shown to have hurt the plaintiff or designed to hurt him. Id. at 131,
233 N.E.2d at 845, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 838. If this were true, such fictionalization would
also not be actionable under right of publicity unless the affirmative defense failed
because of a showing of actual malice.
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docudramatization it is not difficult to tell which elements are
true and which are fiction. Therefore, this process should not
be actionable under a right of publicity claim.
Blending biography and fictional dialogue has been consid-
ered by some commentators to be a form of fictionalization.138
In fact, a docudrama can be a fictionalization if it blends truth
with imaginary events or with events out of chronological order
or any other combination of truth and fiction which causes con-
fusion to the viewer. 39 This type of docudrama may very well
be actionable.
C. Special Considerations for Different Media of Expression
Each medium of expression should be analyzed under the
first amendment, giving special consideration to the confines
and limitations that are unique to the medium, to determine
the amount of leeway necessary to adequately convey ideas
within the medium. The time limitations of film are one such
special consideration. While a written biography is not limited
in the number of pages available, the same story told on film is
limited by scheduling considerations, viewer attention span and
exorbitant costs. Expression through film should, therefore, be
given more "literary license" than expression through print.
This does not mean that because a person's life story is told
through film instead of print the producers should be allowed
to change the story, make up events, et cetera. It means that
while written biographies generally do not include dialogue,
composite characters, 4 0 and time compression,' 4 ' these items
should be allowed in a film version of a biography. They are
necessary to compensate for the particular limitations of film
so that the viewer is not confronted with a dry narrative of the
events.
138. See Manson, supra note 28.
139. In her article, Manson states that society benefits greatly from the informa-
tive nature of that speech which is protected by the first amendment. She argues that
docudramas do not serve the social purpose of providing information because
docudramas cause viewer confusion by blending truth and fiction into fictionalization.
She therefore concludes that docudramas do not deserve any first amendment protec-
tion and, unless explicitly authorized by a celebrity, a celebrity may successfully use
the right of publicity to enjoin such presentations. Id. at 60-61. For purposes of the
present note, it is conceded that no social purpose is furthered by viewer confusion.
140. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.




Docudrama and the Celebrity's Complaint
A. The Celebrity's Complaint
In 1982, David Paradine Television, Inc. began developing a
docudrama for ABC based on the life of Elizabeth Taylor.
142
On learning this, Taylor promptly filed suit in Federal District
Court in New York and called a press conference to announce
the death of this unauthorized docudrama. At the conference,
Taylor stated:
I am suing the ABC television network because they plan on
doing a story of my life which is completely fictionalized unless
there was somebody under the carpet or under the bed during
my 50 years. No matter who portrays me, she will not be me; I
will not be she. I am my own commodity. I am my own indus-
try. The way I look, the way I sound, that is my industry and if
somebody else portrays me and fictionalizes my life, it is taking
away from me. Someday I will write my autobiography, and
perhaps film it, but that will be my choice.143 By doing this,
ABC is taking away from my income.' 44
Taylor's complaint alleged, among other things, violations of
her rights of privacy and publicity.145 She claimed that the pro-
142. Sobel, The Trials and Tribulations of Producing Docu-Dramas: Tales of Eliz-
abeth Taylor, John DeLorean and Network Program Standards, 5 ENT. L. REP. 3
(Aug. 1983).
143. While it is admittedly true that no one else can write her autobiography, Tay-
lor makes the fatal mistake of assuming that she owns her life story in written form.
As already shown, this is not the case. See supra notes 90-139 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, both Manson and Taylor assert that only the celebrity owns the rights
to the film version of her life story. See Manson, The Television Docudrama and the
Right of Publicity, 7 COM. & L. Feb. 1985, at 41-44. If this were true, the celebrity
would not even own his own life story because it would be impossible to present with-
out mentioning at least a few other major characters. It is difficult to imagine a
docudrama on Taylor's life in which Richard Burton is not frequently mentioned. The
arguments made by Taylor and Manson imply that a celebrity could not film her own
life story without receiving express consent from those other major characters whose
lives are so intertwined with hers that it would be difficult to present the story with-
out them. Concededly, the public policy promoting free speech and free dissemina-
tion of information would not require permission from minor, inconsequential
characters, just as permission for their use is not required in biographies or novels.
See infra note 163 and accompanying text. This extension of the Taylor/Manson ar-
gument would cause a substantial chilling effect which is neither desirable nor
warranted.
144. Sobel, supra note 142, at 3.
145. The complaint also alleged violations of her rights under sections 50 and 51 of
the New York Civil Rights Law; section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. (This provision of
the Lanham Act is codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1982).) The crux of this trademark
statute is that false designation of origin and false descriptions are forbidden. This is
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posed film was not a biography nor a documentary of her life,
but was a fictionalized docudrama with invented dialogue and
events.146 Unfortunately, because Taylor dismissed her com-
plaint after ABC decided to scrap the movie for "creative rea-
sons," her theories were never tested in court.47
B. Possible Causes of Action
When a celebrity's life story is presented in an unauthorized
account, there are two possible injuries to the celebrity: (1) em-
barrassment and hurt feelings, and (2) loss of income and earn-
ing potential. From these injuries, there are four possible
causes of action. Invasion of privacy 48 and defamation both
arise from the first category, while the right of publicity and
unfair competition 49 arise from the second. The defamation
and the right of publicity causes of action are illustrative of the
different legal analyses required by each category. The dia-
logue of a docudrama, as fiction, is constitutionally protected.
5 0
Thus, as long as it is completely invented, it is not actionable.'
5 '
But, if verbatim dialogue is blended with invented dialogue,
basically a version of unfair competition which is embodied in the U.S. trademark
laws; § 368-d of New York's General Business Law; and unfair competition. Section
368-d states:
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive
quality of a mark or trade name shall be a ground for injunctive relief in
cases of infringement of a mark registered or not registered or in cases of
unfair competition, notwithstanding the absence of competition between the
parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services.
146. Sobel, supra note 142, at 3.
147. Id.
148. As noted in the text accompanying notes 32-33, supra, the right of publicity
protects interests similar to those protected by invasion of privacy. While the courts
analogize to privacy actions when determining whether a celebrity has a case under
the right of publicity, the celebrity has largely waived any common law privacy rights
he or she may have had. Statutory privacy rights may still be available when the
statute does not distinguish between a private individual with hurt feelings or a celeb-
rity who is interested in economic injury. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying
text.
149. The principles of the common law claim of unfair competition are also found
in the right of publicity. Therefore, no further reference need be made to this claim.
150. See supra notes 103-31 and accompanying text.
151. It could be actionable if the audience thought some of it might be real. But a
disclaimer, as discussed in the text, would cure this problem. In Hicks, the court
noted that the book had the word "novel" on its cover. This, along with the absence of
source or reference materials within its covers, was enough to ensure that the public
would realize that it was fiction. A disclaimer presented at the beginning, at commer-
cials, and at the end of a docudrama, which expressly states that the dialogue is in-
vented by the writers, would be equally effective in avoiding viewer confusion.
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viewer confusion could result and a celebrity could have a cause
of action under defamation law. This confusion could be
avoided by stating at the beginning of the docudrama that all of
the dialogue is fictitious.
152
In a defamation action, a novel would receive treatment dif-
ferent from that which a docudrama would receive. In a novel,
sometimes a character is patterned after a living person. If this
person is easily recognizable and is treated in a defamatory
manner, the person may bring a defamation suit. In essence,
the author asserts that the character is not the plaintiff, but
that the plaintiff did or said the same things as the character.
In such a suit, the plaintiff would allege that, although the book
has a disclaimer that no characters are based on real persons,
living or dead, one character is easily recognizable as the plain-
tiff and that he or she was defamed through this character.
Thus, the plaintiff would allege that the character is the plain-
tiff, but the plaintiff never did or said the things that the char-
acter did or said.
Ironically, the docudrama approach parallels the argument
made by a celebrity on his own behalf in a defamation suit.
That is, in a docudrama the writers are asserting that the char-
acter in the docudrama is the celebrity, but that the celebrity
never said the things that the character said. As long as the
biography portion of the docudrama is true, a celebrity has no
way to refute this argument.
To determine whether a docudrama is a commercial exploita-
tion, it is first necessary to break the docudrama into two
parts-biography and fictional dialogue-and analyze each part
separately. The right of publicity involves property rights.
While biography has commercial value and by nature does re-
fer to a real person, it cannot be owned by anyone because it
consists of facts in the public domain which the first amend-
ment exempts from liability. Although a celebrity may be able
to show that his life story should be within the scope of the
right of publicity, the first amendment exemption will preclude
liability.
Furthermore, a celebrity cannot claim ownership in fiction
which was created by another.153 Thus, because the dialogue in
152. Even if some of the dialogue is exactly what the celebrity said, the celebrity
cannot very well bring an action claiming some of the dialogue is true.
153. See supra notes 103-31 and accompanying text.
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a docudrama is fiction, the celebrity cannot own it and, conse-
quently, cannot prevail in a right of publicity action.
Combining the biography and dialogue (docudramatization)
into a docudrama should not change ownership rights. A
docudrama, consisting of two elements, both of which are ex-
empted from liability by first amendment considerations,
should be accorded those same protections.
Case law indicates that biography is a form of free expression
which is protected by the first amendment.1 5 4 Although Eliza-
beth Taylor will always have the right to present her own auto-
biography or an authorized biography, the right of publicity
will not protect her from a market which is possibly already
diluted with similar products.155
The fact that Taylor's life story is presented in a new medium
of expression (film) should not change her rights. Public policy
promotes invention and development. Docudrama, in its pure
form, is a modernized biography. It tells the same story as a
biographical book but is presented in a new medium, combining
both visual and audio techniques. Television and motion pic-
tures have long been considered significant media of expression
which are protected by constitutional considerations. 156 In a
fast-paced, modern society, a docudrama offers a means of
presenting information to many people who have no time to
read.
A celebrity is still protected by defamation law if he can show
that the dialogue is not only fictional but that it changes the
154. See supra notes 90-102 and accompanying text.
155. A quick scan of the 1982-83 Books in Print showed that at least seven books on
Elizabeth Taylor were in print during those years alone. Furthermore, the more fa-
mous the celebrity is, the greater the demand for information on that celebrity. Evi-
dence of this is seen by the fact that certain celebrities have had several biographies
written about them, e.g., Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis, Marilyn Monroe, Elvis Presley,
etc. Recently, Priscilla Presley came out with a book on her life with Elvis. Although
Elvis has been the subject of many biographies, it is hard to conceive of Priscilla hav-
ing a valid suit for unfair competition. No one has told his story quite the way she has.
Her book will sell, most likely well, in spite of the diluted market. Also, despite the
high cost of movie making, studios have not been deterred from making a docudrama
on someone whose life has already been the subject of a docudrama. Two networks
have aired separate made-for-TV movies on the courtship of Princess Diana and
Prince Charles. The tragedy of Dorothy Stratton's death has been made into both a
made-for-TV movie and a full scale motion picture.
156. Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 865, 603 P.2d 454, 457,
160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 355 (1979); University of Notre Dame v. Twentieth Century-Fox,
22 A.D.2d 452, 457, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301, 305 (1965); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
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underlying biography in a false and defamatory manner. The
celebrity will also have to show that the producer had knowl-
edge of the falsity or acted with reckless disregard of the
truth."7 This could also be considered fictionalization and,
therefore, actionable under the right of publicity.
C. Solutions to the Network Dilemma
ABC's Program Standards provide guidelines regarding the
network's treatment of docudramas.158 The purpose of these
guidelines
is to enable such dramatization to be presented within the
bounds of authenticity as a fair interpretation of the facts,
within the time limit of the dramatic form, and in such a man-
ner as not to mislead, deceive or be untruthful with respect to
the facts of events upon which the dramatization is based.
15 9
The network's standards and practices staff reviews the
docudrama at several stages.160 Every scene in the script must
be annotated, providing detailed substantiation through books,
transcripts, interviews, articles, et cetera.
1 61
ABC allows the use of composite characters (a single charac-
ter based on more than one real person) in minor roles. 62 The
use of composite characters may present a risk to the producer
if such characters are considered fictionalizations, but the use
of composite characters may be necessary to communicate the
ideas in the docudrama's limited time period.
ABC also allows incidental characters to be entirely ficti-
tious. 163 The use of fictitious incidental characters should be of
no consequence. They too are necessary for expressing the idea
within time constraints.
When producing a docudrama, a network should pay close
attention to the biographical nature of the presentation. If the
underlying story is treated as though it were a written biogra-
phy, litigation is precluded. The first amendment exemption
protects a production that remains true to the facts. To do this,
ABC requires that events never be invented.164 The network
157. See supra notes 83-85, 89 and accompanying text.









also requires the application of a chronological timeframe un-
less audio or visual techniques can adequately portray that the
events are out of sequence.
16 5
Moreover, to protect fictional dialogue, a disclaimer should
be presented at the beginning, at commercials, and at the end of
each docudrama. This disclaimer should be used to educate the
public as to the nature of a docudrama 166 and should explicitly
state that the writers invented all of the dialogue. It should be
presented in both audio and visual form to reach the largest
possible audience. In its disclaimer, ABC includes the follow-
ing sentence: "Some composite characters and time compres-
sion have been used for dramatic purposes." '167
Finally, although dialogue is invented, it should be consistent
with the scenes it is being used to enhance. Dialogue is often
used to attribute thoughts and feelings to the speaker and,
although protected as fiction, if used improperly, it can change
the underlying biography. ABC requires that its writers sub-
stantiate a character's attitudes, demeanor, and personal char-
acteristics.168 It also requires that invented dialogue fairly
represent the beliefs of the speakerY 9 ABC requires contro-
versial subjects, such as religion or sexuality, to be verified by
several sources. If the visual portrayal of an event is correct
but the meaning is changed by inappropriate dialogue, the un-
derlying biography may be open to a defamation suit. 70 This
could also approach actionable fictionalization under a right of
publicity claim.
By complying with its standards, ABC apparently hopes to
avoid defamation suits. ABC's guidelines are viable and should
be adopted by other networks. The standards presented are
strict enough for a docudrama to be covered by the first amend-
ment exemption. Consequently, right of publicity actions
should also be precluded.
165. Id.
166. The disclaimer should make clear that a docudrama is based on real events in
the life of a real person but that invented dialogue was necessary for purposes of
presentation in film form.
167. Sobel, supra note 142, at 6.
168. Id.
169. Id.





Docudramas are a viable medium for the expression of ideas
in modern society. They should be accorded full first amend-
ment protection provided they are presented in a well-
researched and accurate manner. If not presented accurately, a
docudrama which approaches fictionalization may be open to
both defamation and right of publicity actions.
The right of publicity protects the celebrity against unau-
thorized commercial exploitation. Docudrama and its compo-
nent parts, biography and fiction, while capable of being viewed
as commercial products, are nonetheless exempted from liabil-
ity under the first amendment. A docudrama that accurately
portrays a celebrity's life story provides valuable information
and entertainment to the public. The public interest in being
informed and entertained outweighs the celebrity's interest in
being compensated for the use of his life story. Therefore,
when a docudrama is accurate, a celebrity cannot use the right
of publicity to obtain either damages or an injunction for this
unauthorized commercial exploitation.
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